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1Of Reasonableness, Fairness and  
the Public interest: 
Judicial Review of Copyright Board  
Decisions in Canada’s Copyright Pentalogy 
graham reynolds
introduction1
On 12 July 2012, five copyright law decisions were handed down 
by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). These decisions have been 
referred to (among other names) as the pentalogy (or the copyright 
pentalogy).2 One of the more contentious topics addressed in the 
pentalogy was judicial review of Copyright Board decisions. Two 
of the five cases dealt with issues relating to judicial review of such 
decisions. 
In one case—Rogers Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [Rogers]—the SCC addressed 
the standard of review that ought to apply to questions of law decided 
by the Copyright Board. Rothstein J, who wrote the reasons for 
judgment, held that the proper standard was one of correctness. In 
concurring reasons, Abella J argued that the majority’s approach did 
not give sufficient deference to the Copyright Board. Instead, Abella J 
advocated for the adoption of a reasonableness standard to be applied 
to questions of law decided by the Copyright Board.
In a second case—Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright 
Licensing Agency (Access Copyright) [Alberta (Education)]—the SCC 
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reviewed the Copyright Board’s application of fair dealing to a specific 
set of facts (an issue which, as I will suggest in Part II.B, is ultimately 
one of statutory interpretation).3 Alberta (Education) arose in the 
context of the Copyright Board’s review of a proposed tariff applied 
for by Access Copyright that would apply to the reproduction of 
works for use in primary and secondary schools in Canada (outside 
Quebec).4 One issue of disagreement with respect to this tariff was 
whether short excerpts from textbooks reproduced by teachers and 
distributed to students (referred to in the decision as Category 4 
copies) met the test for fair dealing. 
The Copyright Board determined that Category 4 copies did 
not meet the test for fair dealing.5 This decision was appealed to 
the FCA, which determined that the Copyright Board’s reasons 
with respect to fair dealing were reasonable.6 The judgment of the 
FCA was appealed to the SCC. Abella J, who wrote the reasons for 
judgment in a 5-4 decision (McLachlin CJ and LeBel, Moldaver and 
Karakatsanis JJ concurring), determined that the Copyright Board’s 
decision with respect to fair dealing was unreasonable.7 Abella J thus 
allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Copyright Board 
for reconsideration in accordance with her reasons.8 
Rothstein J, who wrote dissenting reasons in Alberta (Education) 
(Deschamps, Fish and Cromwell JJ concurring), disagreed with Abella 
J’s conclusion that the Copyright Board’s decision was unreasonable. 
In his dissenting reasons, Rothstein J also implied that Abella J, in 
reaching her conclusion, did not give adequate deference to the 
judgment of the Copyright Board; or, said differently, that Abella J, in 
spite of using the language of reasonableness, inadvertently applied a 
correctness standard instead of a reasonableness standard.9 
A pentalogy can be defined as “a combination of five mutually 
connected parts”.10 Are the five copyright decisions handed down 
by the SCC on 12 July 2012 mutually connected? Is there a coherent 
narrative with respect to judicial review of Copyright Board decisions 
in Canada’s copyright pentalogy? If so, what is this narrative? Is it 
a story of inconsistency and inadvertence, where Abella J advocated 
for deference in one decision11 yet did not give adequate deference 
in another, as suggested by Rothstein J in his dissenting reasons in 
Alberta (Education)? Or is there another story? 
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In this chapter, I suggest that the story told in the pentalogy is 
instead the story of the continuing evolution of the SCC’s interpretation 
of the purpose of the Copyright Act, a process that began in Théberge 
v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc. [Théberge]12 and which is 
ongoing; of the nature of fair dealing and the fairness analysis; and of 
the relationship between the Copyright Board and reviewing courts. 
I will argue that the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted 
by the SCC, is to contribute to the development of a robust public 
domain. In order to fulfill this purpose, it is necessary for courts 
and the Copyright Board to adopt a broad, liberal approach to fair 
dealing. I will suggest that in its decision in Alberta (Education), the 
Copyright Board interpreted fair dealing in a narrow manner that—to 
paraphrase the reasons for judgment of Moldaver JA (as he then was) 
in Toronto Police Services Board v (Ontario) Information and Privacy 
Commissioner [Toronto Police Services Board]—“[failed] to reflect the 
purpose and spirit of the [Copyright Act] and the generous approach 
to [fair dealing] contemplated by it.”13 As a result, the outcome reached 
by the Copyright Board fell outside the range of “possible, acceptable 
outcomes” (this range being defined as the outcomes that flow from 
the adoption of an interpretation of fair dealing or an approach to fair 
dealing that is consistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as 
interpreted by the SCC).14 As a matter of law, it can thus be said that 
it was not open to the Copyright Board to decide the question in the 
way that it did.
Based on this argument, Abella J did not incorrectly apply a 
correctness standard in Alberta (Education). Rather, Abella J applied 
a reasonableness standard of review in a manner consistent with the 
way in which reasonableness has been applied in Dunsmuir v New 
Brunswick [Dunsmuir], in numerous SCC decisions handed down 
post-Dunsmuir, and in several Canadian appellate decisions. As well, 
based on this argument, Abella J’s reasons for judgment in Alberta 
(Education) can be seen as consistent with her concurring reasons 
in Rogers. 
How, then, to explain Rothstein J’s dissenting reasons in Alberta 
(Education)? One point of divergence between the majority and 
dissent in Alberta (Education) relates to the nature of the fairness 
requirement (the second step in the fair dealing analysis). Rothstein 
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J’s dissenting reasons can be seen as being grounded in an assumption 
that fairness is an open-ended discretionary concept; one that is 
capable of multiple interpretations, none of which are preferable 
over any other. If fairness is open-ended, then there would be little 
scope for appellate review on a reasonableness standard. If this were 
the case, almost any decision of the Copyright Board with respect to 
fairness, provided it is transparent and intelligible, would fall within 
the range of “possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in 
respect of the facts and law” (as required by Dunsmuir).15 
However, one conclusion that we can draw from Alberta 
(Education) is that fairness (in the context of fair dealing) is not as 
discretionary a concept as it appears to be. Alberta (Education) and 
Bell clarify that the purpose of the Copyright Act requires a broad, 
liberal approach to fairness. By implication, then, fairness is not 
broad and open-ended; rather, it is infused with certain expectations 
with respect to the way in which it is to be applied (namely, in a large 
and liberal manner).
This chapter will proceed as follows. In Part I, I will briefly discuss 
the (recent) history of judicial review of decisions of the Copyright 
Board. In Part II, I will analyze Abella J’s reasons for judgment in 
Alberta (Education) in light of Rothstein J’s implied suggestion, in 
his dissenting reasons, that Abella J applied a correctness standard as 
opposed to a reasonableness standard. In Part III, I will discuss the 
implications of Alberta (Education) for fair dealing (and specifically 
the fairness analysis), for future Copyright Board decisions, and for 
the relationship between the Copyright Board and reviewing courts. 
i: Judicial Review of Copyright Board Decisions16 
A. Introduction
In 2008, the SCC handed down its decision in Dunsmuir. In this 
decision, Bastarache J and LeBel J delivered joint reasons for 
judgment in which they “reassess[ed]” the “approach to be taken 
in judicial review of decisions of administrative tribunals.”17 Two 
determinations, made by Bastarache J and LeBel J in their reasons 
for judgment, are particularly relevant for this chapter. First, they 
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determined that the existing three standards of review (correctness, 
patent unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter) ought to 
be replaced with two standards—correctness and reasonableness.18 
Second, Bastarache J and LeBel J concluded that “[d]eference will 
usually result where a tribunal is interpreting its own statute or 
statutes closely connected to its function, with which it will have 
particular familiarity”.19 
One question, following Dunsmuir, was the impact that it might 
have on judicial review of Copyright Board decisions. The Copyright 
Board is an “independent administrative tribunal”20 consisting of “not 
more than five members, including a chairman and a vice-chairman, 
to be appointed by the Governor in Council.”21 The chairman of 
the Copyright Board “must be a judge, either sitting or retired, of 
a superior, county or district court.”22 Through this requirement, 
as noted by the FCA in Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers [SOCAN 
v CAIP (FCA)], “[t]he Act…ensures that the Board possesses legal 
expertise.”23 Qualifications for the other members of the Copyright 
Board, including the vice-chairman, are not explicitly set out in the 
Copyright Act (its home statute). While there is no right of appeal 
from Copyright Board decisions, these decisions are subject to 
judicial review by the FCA.24 Would the SCC’s restatement of judicial 
review principles in Dunsmuir impact the standards of review applied 
to questions of law, questions of mixed fact and law, and findings of 
fact made or decided by the Copyright Board? 
B.  Standard of Review to Be Applied to Questions of Law 
Decided by the Copyright Board
At the time Dunsmuir was decided, the leading case addressing the 
standard of review on questions of law decided by the Copyright 
Board was the SCC decision in SOCAN v CAIP.25 Binnie J, who 
delivered the reasons for judgment in SOCAN v CAIP (McLachlin 
CJ and Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, Deschamps 
and Fish JJ concurring26) concluded that the standard of review to 
be applied to questions of law addressed by the Copyright Board is 
correctness.27 
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This determination was a departure from previous decisions in 
which questions of law decided by the Copyright Board had been 
reviewed on a standard of “patent unreasonableness.”28 This standard 
had been applied by courts largely on the basis that courts perceived 
the Copyright Board to be, as noted by Létourneau JA in Canadian 
Assn. of Broadcasters v Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada, “in a better position than…Court[s] to strike a 
proper balance between the interests of copyright owners and users.”29 
The first court to address the issue of the standard of review on 
questions of law decided by the Copyright Board post-Dunsmuir was 
the FCA in Shaw Cablesystems G.P. v Society of Composers, Authors 
and Music Publishers of Canada.30 Citing Dunsmuir, the FCA held 
that “[t]he Board is a specialist tribunal which deals extensively with 
copyright matters. The Act is its home statute. It is therefore entitled 
to deference with respect to its interpretation of that Act.”31 
The FCA’s judgment in Shaw was appealed to the SCC, where it 
was heard as Rogers (one of the cases in the copyright pentalogy).32 
As noted above, the reasons for judgment in Rogers were written 
by Rothstein J.33 Echoing the judgment of Evans JA in SOCAN v 
CAIP, Rothstein J concluded that largely on the basis of “the unusual 
statutory scheme under which the Board and the court may each 
have to consider the same legal question at first instance”,34 and due to 
concerns for consistency,35 the standard of review on questions of law 
decided by the Copyright Board should be correctness.36 
In her concurring reasons in Rogers (to which no other judge 
signed on), Abella J critiqued Rothstein J’s reasons for judgment, 
arguing strongly that courts ought to take a more deferential approach 
to decisions of the Copyright Board. She did so in two main ways: first, 
by advocating for a reasonableness standard of review to be applied 
to questions of law decided by the Copyright Board,37 and second, by 
offering a much more fulsome view of the role and mandate of the 
Copyright Board than that suggested by Rothstein J in Rogers.38
With respect to the question of the standard of review that ought 
to be applied to questions of law decided by the Copyright Board, 
Abella J stated that “since Dunsmuir…this Court has unwaveringly 
held that institutionally expert and specialized tribunals are entitled 
to a presumption of deference when interpreting their home statute.”39 
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In support of this statement, Abella J cited the SCC’s decision 
in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta 
Teachers’ Association [ATA], which Abella J stated stands for the 
proposition that “deference on judicial review is presumed any time 
a tribunal interprets its home statute.”40 Abella J characterized the 
approach adopted by the majority in Rogers—which she summarized 
as “[a]pplying a correctness standard of review on the sole basis 
that a court might interpret the same statute”41—as an “anomalous 
jurisprudential relapse”,42 the consequences of which are to “effectively 
[drain] expert tribunals of the deference and respect they are owed.”43 
In dismissing the majority’s concern about inconsistent results 
that might flow from the adoption of a reasonableness standard of 
review when judicially reviewing Copyright Board decisions, Abella 
J characterized the Copyright Board as a body with “particular 
familiarity and expertise with the provisions of the Copyright Act”.44 
She stated: 
The Act may sometimes be home to other judicial actors 
as part of their varied adjudicative functions, but their 
occasional occupancy should not deprive the Board of 
the deference it is entitled to as the permanent resident 
whose only task is to interpret and apply the Act.45 
This statement implicitly rejects Binnie J’s characterization of the 
Copyright Act, in SOCAN v CAIP, as an “act of general application 
which usually is dealt with before courts rather than tribunals”.46 
Binnie J’s characterization was accepted by Rothstein J in his reasons 
for judgment in Rogers.47 
In addition to disagreeing on the question of which standard of 
review ought to apply to questions of law decided by the Copyright 
Board, Abella J and Rothstein J, in their respective reasons in Rogers, 
also presented very different views of the role and mandate of the 
Copyright Board. In his reasons, Rothstein J affirmed Binnie J’s 
statement in SOCAN v CAIP that “the core of the Board’s mandate is 
‘the working out of the details of an appropriate royalty tariff ’.”48 
Objecting to the characterization of the Copyright Board as a 
mere rate-setter, Abella J instead provided a much more expansive 
view of the role of the Copyright Board. She stated: 
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The Board has specialized expertise in interpreting the 
provisions of the Copyright Act. … The Board does not 
simply “wor[k] out…the details of an appropriate royalty 
tariff ”, despite what is suggested in [SOCAN v CAIP], 
at para. 49. It sets policies that collectively determine 
the rights of copyright owners and users, and plays an 
important role in achieving the proper balance between 
those actors.49
In advocating for a reasonableness standard of review for 
questions of law that are decided by the Copyright Board, and in 
offering a broad interpretation of the Copyright Board and its 
mandate (as opposed to the interpretation of the board’s mandate as 
set out by the majority), Abella J provided, in her concurring reasons 
in Rogers, a robust defence of a deferential approach to decisions of 
the Copyright Board. 
C.  Standard of Review to Be Applied to Findings of Fact and 
Questions of Mixed Fact and Law Made or Decided by the 
Copyright Board
In Dunsmuir, Deschamps J (Charron and Rothstein JJ concurring) 
wrote that in the context of administrative review, deference is 
owed by reviewing courts both with respect to findings of fact and 
questions of mixed fact and law made or decided by administrative 
bodies (implying a reasonableness standard of review).50 The first 
court, post-Dunsmuir, to address the issue of the proper standard 
to be applied to findings of fact made by the Copyright Board was 
the FCA in Alberta (Education) (FCA).51 In this decision, the FCA 
confirmed that the standard of review to be applied when reviewing 
findings of fact made by the Copyright Board was reasonableness.52 
This conclusion was upheld by Abella J in Alberta (Education).53 In 
Canadian Recording Industry Association v Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, the FCA confirmed that 
questions of mixed fact and law decided by the Copyright Board are 
also reviewed on a reasonableness standard.54 
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ii:  The Reasonableness standard applied:  
analyzing abella J’s Reasons in Alberta (Education) 
A. Introduction
In this Part, I will focus on Abella J’s application of the reasonableness 
standard in her reasons in Alberta (Education). As noted above, while 
Abella J (who wrote the majority decision) and Rothstein J (who wrote 
dissenting reasons) agreed that the question of whether photocopies 
made by teachers for their students qualified as fair dealing ought to 
be reviewed on a reasonableness standard,55 they disagreed both on 
how this standard ought to be applied and on the ultimate conclusion 
(namely, whether the Copyright Board’s decision with respect to fair 
dealing was unreasonable). 
Prior to the pentalogy, the leading SCC case to address fair 
dealing was CCH.56 CCH dealt with copyright infringement actions 
brought by legal publishers CCH Canadian Ltd., Thomson Canada 
Ltd. and Canada Law Book Ltd. against the Law Society of Upper 
Canada (LSUC). The publishers alleged, among other claims, that the 
LSUC—which, “[s]ince 1845…has maintained and operated the Great 
Library at Osgoode Hall in Toronto, a reference and research library 
with one of the largest collections of legal materials in Canada”57—
had infringed copyright by “providing [a] custom photocopy service 
in which single copies of the publishers’ works are reproduced and 
sent to patrons upon their request [and by]…maintaining self-service 
photocopiers and copies of the publishers’ works in the Great Library 
for use by its patrons”.58
In the course of her decision (in which she found that the LSUC had 
not infringed copyright), McLachlin CJ, writing for the Court, made 
several statements with respect to the nature and scope of fair dealing. 
Specifically, McLachlin CJ noted that fair dealing is an “integral part of 
the Copyright Act”;59 that it is a “user’s right”;60 and that “[i]n order to 
maintain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner 
and users’ interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively”.61
Fair dealing is the broadest defence to copyright infringement 
available under the Copyright Act.62 Under fair dealing, individuals 
have, in certain circumstances, the “right” to use a substantial amount 
of copyright-protected expression without the authorization of the 
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copyright owner.63 The fair dealing analysis proceeds in two steps. 
First, it must be established that the dealing was done for one of eight 
purposes, namely research, private study, education, parody, satire, 
criticism, review and news reporting.64 Dealings done for the purpose 
of criticism, review or news reporting, in order to be considered fair, 
must also satisfy certain attribution requirements.65 Second, it must 
be established that the dealing was “fair.”66 
With respect to the second part of the fair dealing analysis, 
McLachlin CJ, in CCH, noted that “[t]he Copyright Act does not 
define what will be fair; whether something is fair is a question of fact 
and depends on the facts of each case”.67 In support of this statement, 
she cited the judgment of Lord Denning M.R. in Hubbard v Vosper 
[Hubbard] in which he noted that “[i]t is impossible to define what is 
‘fair dealing’. It must be a question of degree…after all is said in done, 
it must be a matter of impression.”68
In the attempt to provide some guidance to future decision makers 
with respect to the fairness analysis, McLachlin CJ set out a list of 
factors outlined originally by Linden JA that, in the view of the SCC, 
“provides a useful analytical framework to govern determinations 
of fairness in future cases”.69 Specifically, based on CCH, factors that 
may be considered are the purpose of the dealing, the character of 
the dealing, the amount of the dealing, alternatives to the dealing, the 
nature of the work, and the effect of the dealing on the work.70 
As described earlier, in Alberta (Education), in the context of 
reviewing the tariff proposed by Access Copyright, the Copyright 
Board determined that short excerpts from textbooks reproduced 
by teachers and distributed to students did not meet the test for fair 
dealing. This determination was reviewed first by the FCA (which held 
that it was reasonable) and subsequently by the SCC. In her decision, 
Abella J concluded that “the Board’s finding of unfairness was based 
on…a misapplication of the CCH factors.”71 As a result, Abella J held 
that “its outcome was rendered unreasonable.”72 Consequently, Abella 
J allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Copyright Board 
for reconsideration based on her reasons.73 
Rothstein J, in his dissenting reasons, disagreed with Abella J, 
stating that “[i]n my view, the Board made no reviewable error in 
principle in construing the CCH factors and, with one relatively minor 
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exception, its factual analysis, application of the CCH factors to the 
facts and its conclusions were not unreasonable.”74 Rothstein J also 
objected to what he viewed as the approach taken by Abella J in her 
reasons for judgment, implying that Abella J did not give adequate 
deference to the Copyright Board with respect to its analysis of the 
fairness (or CCH) factors. As Rothstein J stated: “The application of 
these factors to the facts of each case by the Copyright Board should 
be treated with deference on judicial review. A principled deferential 
review requires that courts be cautious not to inadvertently slip into a 
more intrusive, correctness review.”75
Rothstein J’s contention that Abella J did not give adequate 
deference to the Copyright Board in her decision in Alberta (Education) 
merits further analysis, particularly given Abella J’s concurring reasons 
in Rogers in which Abella J called for greater deference to be given to 
decisions of the Copyright Board. What can explain this outcome?
As noted above, one explanation—alluded to by Rothstein 
J, in his dissenting reasons in Alberta (Education), is that Abella J, 
in her reasons for judgment in Alberta (Education), “inadvertently 
[slipped] into a more intrusive, correctness review.”76 Based on this 
explanation, Abella J did not give adequate deference to the decision 
of the Copyright Board; rather, she simply substituted her judgment 
for that of the Copyright Board. This explanation, however, implies 
an inconsistency between Abella J’s decision in Alberta (Education) 
and her concurring reasons in Rogers—that Abella J advocated for 
deference to be given to determinations of the Copyright Board in one 
case, yet failed to give deference in another. Such an inconsistency—
particularly given that Rogers and Alberta (Education) were heard by 
the SCC on back-to-back days, and the judgments delivered on the 
same day—would be surprising. 
I suggest that there is another explanation. Specifically, in this 
Part, I suggest that the Copyright Board, in applying fair dealing to 
a specific set of facts, adopted an approach to fair dealing that was 
inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by 
the SCC. In so doing, it reached an outcome that fell outside of the 
range of possible, acceptable outcomes. As a result, Abella J’s decision 
to allow the appeal did not reflect a lack of deference to the decision 
of the Copyright Board.
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In the next section of this Part, I will describe the application 
of the reasonableness standard, post-Dunsmuir, in the context of 
statutory interpretation. While the question of “whether something 
is fair is a question of fact”, as noted by McLachlin CJ in CCH,77 the 
question of how to interpret and apply fair dealing is ultimately a 
question of statutory interpretation. The interpretation or approach 
adopted by a court or the Copyright Board to fair dealing is (or ought 
to be) informed by their view of the purpose of the legislation as a 
whole. Thus interpreted, fair dealing is applied to the facts of the case, 
making the question dealt with in Alberta (Education) a question of 
mixed fact and law, reviewable on a reasonableness standard.78 In 
numerous judgments, as will be described below, reviewing courts 
have found decisions of administrative bodies to be unreasonable on 
the basis that the administrative body adopted an interpretation of 
the statutory provisions in question that was inconsistent with the 
purpose of the legislation, as interpreted by the reviewing court.
B.  The Application of the Reasonableness Standard in the 
Context of Statutory Interpretation 
In Dunsmuir, the SCC describes reasonableness as a 
[D]eferential standard animated by the principle that 
underlies the development of the two previous standards 
of reasonableness: certain questions that come before 
administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one 
specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to 
a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals 
have a margin of appreciation within the range of 
acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a 
review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that 
make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process 
of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial 
review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the 
existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility 
within the decision-making process. But it is also 
concerned with whether the decision falls within a range 
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of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in 
respect of the facts and law.79 
In Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland 
and Labrador (Treasury Board) [NLNU],80 Abella J (writing for 
the Court) clarified the approach taken by reviewing courts in 
determining whether a decision of an administrative decision maker 
is unreasonable.81 Rather than requiring the reviewing court to 
engage in “two discrete analyses—one for the reasons and a separate 
one for the result”, Abella J described the reasonableness analysis as a 
“more organic exercise—the reasons must be read together with the 
outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls 
within a range of possible outcomes.”82 
As noted in Catalyst Paper Corp. v North Cowichan (District) 
(following Dunsmuir), “reasonableness must be assessed in the 
context of the particular type of decision making involved and all 
relevant factors”.83 In the context of cases in which the issue being 
reviewed involves the tribunal’s interpretation of a specific statutory 
provision, many reviewing courts engage in a process of statutory 
interpretation in order to determine whether the “decision falls 
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible 
in respect of the facts and law.”84 Abella J, who delivered the judgment 
of the Court in Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney General) [Celgene], 
described “statutory interpretation [as] involv[ing] a consideration of 
the ordinary meaning of the words used and the statutory context in 
which they are found…. The words, if clear, will dominate; if not, they 
yield to an interpretation that best meets the overriding purpose of 
the statute”.85 
Reviewing courts engage in the process of statutory interpretation, 
at least theoretically, not to determine whether they would agree 
with the outcome reached by the tribunal (this would be an 
inappropriate application of the correctness standard in the context 
of a reasonableness analysis), but to determine the range of possible 
outcomes (thus allowing the reviewing court to determine whether 
the tribunal’s decision fell within the range of possible, acceptable 
outcomes, even if it is not the outcome that the reviewing court itself 
would have adopted).86 
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This is not to say, however, that some courts engaged in this 
process of statutory interpretation do not “inadvertently slip into 
a more intrusive, correctness review”.87 This concern was noted by 
Binnie J in ATA.88 Binnie J pointed to two cases—Dunsmuir89 and 
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney 
General) [CHRC]90—in which he argued that “the intensity of 
scrutiny” applied by the reviewing courts was “not far removed from 
a correctness analysis”.91 Similarly, Gus Van Harten, Gerald Heckman 
and David J. Mullan have noted that 
[o]ccasionally, there are cases, usually involving issues 
of legal interpretation, where a court applies the 
reasonableness standard in a way that appears to show 
little if any deference to the decision-maker. In such 
cases, it is pertinent to ask whether the court carried 
through on its commitment to defer or whether, instead, 
the court engaged in correctness review ‘in disguise.’92
In addition to questioning whether some reviewing courts might 
use this process to engage in “correctness review ‘in disguise’”,93 it 
can also be asked, more broadly, how the range of possible outcomes 
should be determined. In the context of a case involving statutory 
interpretation, should the court’s determination of statutory 
purposes trump that of the administrative tribunal? This approach 
sits uneasily with the idea of “deference as respect” articulated by 
David Dyzenhaus and adopted by the SCC in Dunsmuir.94 Rather, it 
seems to perpetuate a policy of judicial supremacy over the actions of 
administrative tribunals.95
The resolution of this question is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to address. Instead, this chapter will merely note that the 
approach to the reasonableness analysis described above, in which 
the reviewing court determines whether the outcome reached by the 
tribunal falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes after 
having engaged in the process of statutory interpretation in order to 
ascertain the range of outcomes, has been adopted in numerous SCC 
and Canadian appellate decisions since Dunsmuir. 
In many of these cases, reviewing courts have found decisions 
of administrative tribunals to be unreasonable, at least in part on 
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the basis that the tribunal’s approach to or interpretation of specific 
statutory provisions was inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, 
as interpreted by the reviewing court. In Dunsmuir, for instance, 
Bastarache and LeBel JJ critiqued the “reasoning process of the 
adjudicator”, suggesting that it was “deeply flawed” in that “[i]t relied 
on and led to a construction of the statute that fell outside of the range 
of admissible statutory interpretations”.96
A similar approach was adopted in CHRC.97 After having 
engaged in an interpretive process to determine the range of possible 
outcomes, LeBel and Cromwell JJ (McLachlin CJ and Deschamps, 
Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ concurring), stated that
[i]n our view, the text, context and purpose of the 
legislation clearly show that there is no authority in the 
Tribunal to award legal costs and that there is no other 
reasonable interpretation of the relevant provisions. 
Faced with a difficult point of statutory interpretation 
and conflicting judicial authority, the Tribunal adopted 
a dictionary meaning of “expenses” and articulated what 
it considered to be a beneficial policy outcome rather 
than engage in an interpretive process taking account of 
the text, context and purpose of the provisions in issue. 
In our respectful view, this led the Tribunal to adopt an 
unreasonable interpretation of the provisions.98
In Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Canada (Public Works 
and Government Services) [HRM]99 (Cromwell J, writing for the 
Court), the Minister of Public Works and Government Services’ 
determination that “roughly 40 acres of the Halifax Citadel National 
Historic Site of Canada has only nominal value for the purposes of 
municipal taxation”100 was held to be unreasonable on the basis that 
it was “inconsistent with the Act’s purpose”.101 As the Minister had 
adopted an approach that would “[defeat] Parliament’s purpose”, the 
outcome reached as a result of this approach was determined to fall 
outside the range of possible, acceptable outcomes.102
This type of approach to the reasonableness analysis has also 
been adopted in several decisions of appellate courts. For instance, in 
Toronto Police Services Board, Moldaver JA (as he then was) (Sharpe 
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and Blair JJA concurring) restored the order of the Adjudicator and 
set aside the order of the Divisional Court (which had found the 
Adjudicator’s interpretation of s 2(1)(b) of the Municipal Freedom 
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to be unreasonable) 
on the basis that “[t]he Divisional Court [gave] s 2(1)(b) a narrow 
construction—one which…[failed] to reflect the purpose and spirit 
of the Act and the generous approach to access [to information] 
contemplated by it”.103 
Celgene is an example of a decision in which the SCC determined 
that the tribunal’s decision fell within the range of possible, acceptable 
outcomes (and was thus reasonable) largely on the basis that the 
tribunal’s decision was consistent with the purpose of the statutory 
provisions, as interpreted by the reviewing court.104 In Celgene, Abella 
J framed the question to be decided as whether the interpretation 
adopted by the Patent Medicine Prices Review Board (Board) 
of ss. 80(1)(b), 83(1) and 85 of the Patent Act was “justified.”105 In 
order to determine the answer to this question, Abella J relied on 
general principles of statutory interpretation, noting that the Board 
adopted an interpretation of these provisions that was “guided by the 
consumer protection goals of its mandate”106 and stating that “[t]he 
Board’s interpretive choice is supported by the legislative history”.107 
Abella J determined that in adopting an interpretation of ss. 80(1)(b), 
83(1) and 85 of the Patent Act that was consistent with the Board’s 
consumer protection purpose, the Board had reached an outcome 
that fell within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes. 
As this section has demonstrated, in a number of cases, reviewing 
courts have found tribunal decisions to be either reasonable or 
unreasonable on the basis that the tribunal had adopted an approach 
to or an interpretation of statutory provisions that was either 
consistent with or inconsistent with the purpose of the legislation, 
as interpreted by the reviewing court. In the next section, I will 
argue that consistent with the decisions described above, Abella J, in 
Alberta (Education), determined that the Copyright Board’s decision 
was unreasonable on the basis that it adopted an approach to fair 
dealing that was inconsistent with the purpose of copyright, as 
interpreted by the SCC.
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C.  The Application of the Reasonableness Standard in Alberta 
(Education)
a.  The Continuing Evolution of the Purpose of the Copyright 
Act, as Interpreted by the SCC
i.  The Author-centric Approach to Copyright
In Bell, Abella J, writing for the Court, referenced the “author-
centric” view of copyright in her reasons for judgment.108 She described 
this view of copyright as “focus[ing] on the exclusive right of authors 
and copyright owners to control how their works were used in the 
marketplace,”109 and cited Bishop v Stevens as an example of an SCC case in 
which this approach to copyright was employed.110 Abella J’s description 
of the author-centric approach to copyright can be seen as implying 
that the purpose of the Copyright Act, under this approach, is to reward 
and protect authors and copyright owners.111 As well, based on this 
statement, it can be suggested that under the author-centric approach to 
copyright, owners’ rights are to be interpreted broadly, while exceptions 
to copyright infringement are to be interpreted narrowly. Interpreting 
the Copyright Act in such a manner would be consistent with the focus 
of the Copyright Act being on authors and copyright owners (and not on 
users or the broader public interest, for instance). Citing Carys Craig, 
Abella J noted that under the author-centric approach to copyright, “any 
benefit the public might derive from the copyright system [is] only ‘a 
fortunate by-product of private entitlement.’”112 Based on this statement, 
it can be suggested that the author-centric approach privileges private 
interests over broad consideration of the public interest. 
In Bell, Abella J described the author-centric approach to copyright 
as the “former framework” and the “earlier” view of copyright.113 This 
choice of diction is significant. It implies that this view of copyright 
was, at one time, the dominant conception of copyright in Canada. It 
also implies that this is no longer the case. What, then, is the current 
governing approach to copyright in Canada?
ii. The Instrumental–Public Interest Approach
Beginning in Théberge and most recently affirmed in the 
pentalogy,114 the SCC has interpreted the Copyright Act as supporting 
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a conceptualization of copyright as a mechanism (or instrument) 
employed to achieve a specific outcome. I refer to this approach to 
copyright as the instrumental–public interest approach. Under this 
approach to copyright, the purpose of the Copyright Act is to advance 
the public interest by contributing to the development of a “robustly 
cultured and intellectual public domain”.115 
Copyright contributes to the development of the public domain by 
providing an economic incentive for the creation and dissemination 
of works of the arts and intellect.116 This economic incentive spurs 
the creation and dissemination of works that would otherwise not 
have been created or disseminated. Once created and made public, 
these works become available for certain types of unauthorized 
uses (thus facilitating future creation and contributing to a vibrant 
public domain). In order to ensure that the economic incentive of 
copyright functions properly (and that individuals continue to invest 
in the creation and dissemination of expression), copyright owners 
must receive a “just” or “fair reward.”117 Ensuring a fair reward for 
copyright owners is thus consistent with and advances the public 
interest in a vibrant public domain. As such, it is an integral part of 
the instrumental–public interest approach to copyright. 
Interpreting the rights of copyright owners too broadly, however, 
could negatively impact and run counter to the public interest. 
To quote McLachlin CJ, the “public domain…flourish[es]” when 
“others are able to produce new works by building on the ideas 
and information contained in the works of others”.118 It becomes 
impoverished if copyright owners are able to restrict, to too great 
a degree, the ideas, information and expression contained within 
their works. 
Ensuring that information and expression is disseminated is 
crucial in maintaining a vibrant public domain. Works that are 
not disseminated (or that are not disseminated broadly) cannot 
be accessed or used by others. As noted by Binnie J in Théberge, 
“[e]xcessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of 
intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public 
domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-
term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to 
proper utilization”.119
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Recognizing that overcompensating copyright owners risks 
harming the public interest in a vibrant public domain, the SCC has 
taken several steps to limit the rights of copyright owners. First, it 
has emphasized that the rights of copyright owners are of a “limited 
nature”.120 As noted by Binnie J in Théberge, “[i]n crassly economic 
terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors 
… as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate them”.121 Second, 
the SCC has also reframed exceptions, limitations and defences 
to copyright infringement as “users’ rights”.122 Users’ rights help 
to mediate “[e]xcessive control by holders of copyrights” and, as a 
result, to protect the public domain.123 In so doing, users’ rights play 
an “essential” role in “furthering the public interest objectives of the 
Copyright Act”.124 Fair dealing, the broadest users’ right set out in the 
Copyright Act, contributes to the development of a vibrant public 
domain by giving individuals the right to reproduce, build upon and 
disseminate works of the arts and intellect in various ways.
Under the instrumental–public interest approach, fair dealing 
and other user rights are seen as an “integral part of the Copyright 
Act”.125 As such, they “must not be interpreted restrictively”.126 
The role played by the fairness analysis (the second step in the fair 
dealing analysis) is particularly important in “balanc[ing] between 
protection and access”127 and in advancing the public interest in a 
vibrant public domain. Abella J has described the fairness analysis 
as the part of the test in which the “analytical heavy-hitting is done 
in determining whether the dealing was fair”.128 It is thus crucial, 
under the instrumental-public interest approach to copyright, that 
the fairness analysis not be interpreted restrictively.129 Under this 
approach to copyright, both fair dealing (broadly) and the fairness 
analysis (specifically) must be given large, liberal interpretations.
b.  Abella J’s Decision in Alberta (Education) Focuses  
on the Approach to Fair Dealing Adopted by the 
Copyright Board
In his dissenting reasons, Rothstein J suggested that Abella J 
“seize[d] upon a few arguable statements or intermediate findings to 
conclude that the overall decision is unreasonable”.130 I suggest that 
20   |   THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY
this is not the case. Although Abella J does not explicitly ground her 
decision in the text of Dunsmuir or other, more recent SCC decisions 
in the area of administrative law, I suggest that Abella J—in a manner 
consistent with the way in which Dunsmuir has been interpreted by 
numerous SCC and Court of Appeal decisions, as described above—
found the decision of the Copyright Board to be unreasonable on the 
basis that it adopted an approach to fair dealing that was inconsistent 
with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC. By 
virtue of its adoption of such an approach, the outcome reached by 
the Copyright Board fell outside the range of “possible, acceptable 
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”.131 
The contention that Abella J’s reasons for judgment focused on 
the overall approach to fair dealing taken by the Copyright Board 
and not to a few isolated statements or findings is supported by 
reference to Abella J’s reasons for judgment. On numerous occasions 
throughout her reasons for judgment, Abella J indicated that she 
took issue either with how the Copyright Board “approached” a 
fairness factor, or the “approach” taken by the Copyright Board in the 
context of its fair dealing analysis. For instance, Abella J stated that 
“[i]n my view, the key problem is in the way the Board approached 
the ‘purpose of the dealing’ factor”;132 she distinguished several 
authorities from the United Kingdom on the basis that “courts in the 
U.K. have tended to take a more restrictive approach to determining 
the ‘purpose’ of the dealing than does CCH”;133 she critiqued “[t]he 
Board’s approach” for “driv[ing] an artificial wedge” into what she 
states are the “unified purposes” of “teacher/copier and student/
user”;134 she stated that “[t]he Board’s skewed characterization of the 
teachers’ role…also led to a problematic approach to the ‘amount of 
the dealing’ factor”,135 noting that this was a “flawed approach”;136 
she stated that she “[had] difficulty with how the Board approached 
the ‘alternatives to the dealing’ factor”,137 noting that “the Board’s 
approach” led to a “demonstrably unrealistic outcome”;138 and stated 
that “[t]he final problematic application of a fairness factor by the 
Board was its approach to the ‘effect of the dealing on the work’”.139 
In the penultimate paragraph in her decision, Abella J connected 
the Board’s approach to the outcome that it reached, stating that 
“[b]ecause the Board’s finding of unfairness was based on what was, in 
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my respectful view, a misapplication of the CCH factors, its outcome 
was rendered unreasonable”.140 
I will proceed by discussing the approach to copyright adopted by 
the Copyright Board in Alberta (Education). I will demonstrate that 
the Copyright Board, in its decision, adopted an interpretation of fair 
dealing that was inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, 
as interpreted by the SCC. In so doing, it arrived at an outcome that 
was outside of the range of possible, acceptable outcomes.
c.  The Approach to Fair Dealing Adopted by the Copyright 
Board in Alberta (Education) was Inconsistent with the 
Purpose of the Copyright Act, as Interpreted by the SCC
Although acknowledging that CCH is the “unavoidable starting 
point of any analysis of fair dealing”,141 the Copyright Board, through 
the course of its decision, interpreted and applied both CCH and 
fair dealing more generally in a narrow, restrictive manner. Such an 
approach is inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as 
interpreted by the SCC, namely to contribute to the development of 
a strong, robust public domain.142 This purpose, as outlined above, 
requires a large, liberal interpretation to be given to user’s rights such 
as fair dealing. 
The approach adopted by the Copyright Board, on the other hand, 
is more consistent with the author-centric approach, under which the 
purpose of the Copyright Act is to reward and protect authors and 
copyright owners. The Copyright Board adopted such an approach in 
order to have its analysis “conform with”143 article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention144 and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement145 and to reach 
the only result that it believed was consistent with these two treaty 
provisions—a result it viewed as “self-evident”—namely, “that copies 
made on a teacher’s initiative for his or her students either conflict 
with the normal exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the rights holders” and as a result ought not 
to satisfy fair dealing.146 
The Copyright Board’s decision to interpret fair dealing in a manner 
consistent with the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement—done 
on the basis of its view that “the Supreme Court has been placing 
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significant emphasis on treaties that Canada has not yet ratified; it 
seems even more crucial to account for those that have been”147—is 
not in itself necessarily unreasonable.148 However, both article 9(2) 
of the Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement 
can be seen as presenting a view of limitations and exceptions to 
copyright infringement that is inconsistent with the purpose of the 
Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC. Both article 9(2) of the 
Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement portray 
limitations and exceptions to copyright infringement as carve-outs 
from the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, as opposed to integral 
elements of the copyright scheme that must not be interpreted 
restrictively. In interpreting CCH through the lens of these two 
articles, the Copyright Board adopted an approach to copyright that 
was more reflective of now-rejected interpretations of the purpose 
of the Copyright Act—namely, to reward and protect authors and 
copyright owners—than contemporary interpretations of its purpose, 
as interpreted by the SCC. 
The Copyright Board’s adoption of a narrow, restrictive 
interpretation of fair dealing is evident in several ways that will be 
described in more detail below. First, several statements from CCH 
that point to the continuing evolution in the SCC’s interpretation 
of the purpose of the Copyright Act were absent from the Copyright 
Board’s decision in Alberta (Education); second, the Copyright 
Board reframed one of the central conclusions reached in CCH in a 
manner that is more reflective of now-rejected interpretations of the 
purpose of the Copyright Act than contemporary interpretations of 
its purpose, as interpreted by the SCC; third, the Copyright Board 
repeatedly adopted a narrow interpretation of the scope of CCH; 
and fourth, the Copyright Board made certain assumptions when 
evaluating the fairness factors set out in CCH that led it to conclude 
that the factors tended to unfairness. Taken together, these elements 
of the Copyright Board’s decision suggest that the approach to fair 
dealing adopted by the Copyright Board was inconsistent with the 
purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC.
As noted above, the Copyright Board began its fair dealing analysis 
by stating that “CCH now is the unavoidable starting point of any 
analysis of the notion of fair dealing”.149 It then set out what it viewed 
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as the “substance of the propositions resulting from that decision”.150 
The Copyright Board summarized CCH’s main principles as follows: 
76 First, all exceptions provided in the Act are now 
users’ rights. They must be given a liberal interpretation, 
according to the purposes of copyright in general, 
including maintaining a balance between the rights of 
copyright holders and the interests of users, and the 
exception in particular.
77  Second, the fair dealing exception applies only 
to certain allowable purposes: private study, research, 
criticism, review, and news reporting. Dealings for other 
purposes are not covered by the exception, even if they 
would otherwise be fair. 
78  Third, dealings for an allowable purpose are not 
ipso facto fair. The fairness of the dealing is assessed 
separately, according to an open list of factors including 
the purpose, character and amount of the dealing, 
available alternatives, the nature of the work and the 
effect of the dealing on the work.
79  Fourth, since all of the conditions for application 
of the exception must be satisfied, the exception will not 
apply as long as any one condition is not met.
80  Fifth, a practice or a system may constitute a 
“dealing” just as well as an individual act. The exception 
can benefit a practice or system if it is established either 
that all of the individual dealings are research-based and 
fair, or that the practice or the system itself is research-
based and fair.
81  Sixth, the notion of fair dealing is a legal concept 
that must be interpreted according to the framework laid 
down in CCH. […]151
Certain important elements of CCH are absent from this 
summary. While the mere fact that “[r]easons may not include all the 
arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other details the 
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reviewing judge would have preferred…does not impugn the validity 
of either the reasons or the result under a reasonableness analysis”, 
as noted by Abella J in NLNU,152 the manner in which the Copyright 
Board summarized CCH reveals inconsistencies, with respect to the 
scope of defences to copyright infringement, between the approach 
adopted by the Copyright Board and the purpose of the Copyright 
Act, as interpreted by the SCC. Three elements of CCH, in particular, 
are absent from the Copyright Board’s summary. 
First, in CCH, fair dealing is referred to as an “integral part of 
the Copyright Act”153 and an “integral part of the scheme of copyright 
law.”154 Reference to fair dealing as being “integral” to the Copyright 
Act is absent from the Copyright Board’s decision. This absence can 
perhaps be attributed to the Copyright Board’s view that the Copyright 
Act ought to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Berne 
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. Conceiving of fair dealing as 
an “integral” part of the Copyright Act can be seen as inconsistent with 
the adoption of a view of fair dealing that is “confine[d]” to “certain 
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
right holder”, as articulated in article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.155 
Second, in CCH, McLachlin CJ referenced Binnie J’s statement in 
Théberge that one must not only “recogniz[e] the creator’s rights but…
giv[e] due weight to their limited nature.”156 Reference to the “limited 
nature” of creator’s rights is absent from the Copyright Board’s 
decision. Instead, the Copyright Board noted that its approach “helps 
to ‘maintain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright 
owner and users’ interests’ and avoid restricting them unduly (since 
both copyright owners’ interests and users’ rights can be unduly 
restricted)”.157 The idea that the Copyright Board should guard against 
interpreting the Copyright Act in a manner that would unduly restrict 
the rights of copyright owners (perhaps through a large and liberal 
approach to users’ rights) echoes the language used in article 9(2) of 
the Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, and is 
more consistent with the author-centric approach to copyright than 
with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC. To 
refer to the interests of copyright owners as being “limited”—as was 
done in CCH —could be seen as being inconsistent with the language 
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used in article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and article 13 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which focuses on the need for states to ensure that 
exceptions or limitations to exclusive rights are not interpreted in an 
overbroad manner.
Third, in CCH, in the context of discussing the originality standard, 
McLachlin CJ stated that creating “safeguard[s] against the author 
being overcompensated for his or her work…helps ensure that there 
is room for the public domain to flourish as others are able to produce 
new works by building on the ideas and information contained in the 
works of others.”158 No reference to this statement, or to the idea of 
the public domain more generally, is made in the Copyright Board’s 
decision in Alberta (Education). Although the Copyright Board was 
not required to include reference to this statement (or the concept 
of the public domain, more broadly) in its reasons, its absence again 
suggests an inconsistency between the approach adopted by the 
Copyright Board and the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted 
by the SCC.
In addition to selectively quoting from and reframing elements 
of CCH, the Copyright Board, through the course of its decision in 
Alberta (Education), also repeatedly interpreted CCH in a restrictive 
manner. It did so in several ways. First, while noting that the “notion 
of research must be interpreted broadly,”159 a comment that draws 
directly from the statement by the SCC in CCH that “‘[r]esearch’ must 
be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that users’ 
rights are not unduly constrained,”160 the Copyright Board then stated 
that “it appears that CCH did not challenge previous interpretations 
of the notion of private study.”161 In making this statement, the 
Copyright Board thus chose not to interpret CCH as authority for 
the proposition that a “large and liberal interpretation” ought to be 
applied to all fair dealing purposes (and not simply the purpose at 
issue in CCH itself).162 As well as serving as a restrictive interpretation 
of CCH, this statement is also inconsistent with the language used 
by the SCC in CCH. Three paragraphs after stating that “‘research’ 
must be given a large and liberal interpretation,” the SCC broadens 
the scope of this statement, noting that “the allowable purposes under 
the Copyright Act, namely research, private study, criticism, review or 
news reporting…should not be given a restrictive interpretation or 
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this could result in the undue restriction of users’ rights”.163
Second, the Copyright Board, in the course of its decision, 
relied on judgments in which a restrictive approach to fair dealing 
was adopted. For instance, in support of its view that the purpose of 
the dealing should be analyzed from the perspective of the teacher 
or copier rather than from the perspective of the ultimate user, the 
Copyright Board relied heavily on three decisions, two of which were 
from the United Kingdom. As noted by Abella J, however, “courts in the 
U.K. have tended to take a more restrictive approach to determining 
the ‘purpose’ of the dealing than does CCH”.164 Thus, relying on 
these decisions can itself be seen as inconsistent with the purpose of 
the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC (which mandates the 
adoption of a large and liberal interpretation to fair dealing). 
A third example of the Copyright Board’s application of a 
restrictive interpretation of CCH is found in the way in which it 
distinguished between the role of the teacher in a school and that 
of staff at the Great Library. Describing these two roles as “scarcely 
comparable”, the Copyright Board noted that165 
[T]he teacher-student relationship is not the same as 
that between the Great Library and lawyers. The Great 
Library is simply an extension of a lawyer’s will. A 
teacher does not merely act on behalf of a student, given 
that, to a large extent, it is the teacher who instructs the 
student what to do with the material copied.166
In constructing the comparison between teachers and staff at the Great 
Library in such a manner, the Copyright Board narrowed the ambit 
of CCH to situations in which an intermediary acts as an extension of 
the will of the user. In so doing, the Copyright Board was able to avoid 
overtly challenging the determination in CCH while concluding that, 
in this instance, fair dealing was not made out. 
The characterization of teachers adopted by the Copyright Board 
(as performing a role very different from staff at the Great Library) 
was not the only characterization that could have been adopted. 
Instead of being seen as having roles that are “scarcely comparable”, 
teachers and the staff at the Great Library could instead have been 
seen as playing similar roles, in that both attempt to increase access to 
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works of the arts and intellect. This appears to be the approach taken 
by Abella J, who noted that “[t]he teacher…facilitates wider access 
to [the] limited number of [purchased originals] by making copies 
available to all students who need them”.167 This approach is consistent 
with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC.
A fourth instance of the Copyright Board adopting a narrow, 
restrictive interpretation of CCH is found in the way in which the 
Copyright Board interpreted CCH as indicating that in order for a 
photocopy made by one party (A) for another party (B) to qualify 
for the purpose of research, B must request the copy (thus imposing 
a procedural requirement not dictated by the SCC in CCH). Abella J 
pointed out that
Nowhere in CCH did the Court suggest that the lawyer 
had to ‘request’ the photocopies of legal works from 
the Great Library before those copies could be said to 
be for the purpose of ‘research.’ On the contrary, what 
the Court found was that the copies of legal works were 
‘necessary conditions of research and thus part of the 
research process’…. Similarly, photocopies made by a 
teacher and provided to primary and secondary school 
students are an essential element in the research and 
private study undertaken by those students.168
The final way in which the Copyright Board interpreted and 
applied fair dealing in a manner inconsistent with the purpose of 
the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC, is demonstrated in 
the assumptions made by the Copyright Board when evaluating the 
fairness factors; assumptions that led it to conclude that the factors 
tended to unfairness and that, as a result, the dealing was not fair. For 
instance, when evaluating the alternatives to the dealing factor, the 
Copyright Board determined that it tended to unfairness on the basis 
that there was an alternative to the dealing—namely, that educational 
institutions could “[b]uy the originals to distribute to students or to 
place in the library for consultation.”169 The assumption made by the 
Copyright Board in the context of reaching this conclusion was that 
schools could afford to purchase multiple copies of original texts to 
distribute to students. The Copyright Board stated that “[t]he fact 
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that the establishment has limited means does not seem to bar the 
recognition of this point.”170 This is a curious statement, given that 
in the previous sentence, the Copyright Board notes that this option 
(namely, purchasing the book) is, “from a practical standpoint…not 
open to the student.”171 
On the basis of this assumption, the Copyright Board was able 
to conclude that the alternatives to the dealing factor tended to 
unfairness (a conclusion that contributed to the Copyright Board’s 
ultimate conclusion that the dealing at issue was unfair). Abella J was 
highly critical of the Copyright Board’s suggestion that schools could 
“buy the original texts to distribute to each student,” describing this 
suggestion as “a demonstrably unrealistic outcome”.172 
With respect to two other factors to be considered in the fair 
dealing analysis, namely the amount of the dealing and the effect of 
the dealing on the work, the Copyright Board made assumptions, 
in the apparent absence of evidence, that led it to conclude that 
the factors tended to unfairness. In CCH, the SCC had noted that 
in assessing the amount of the dealing, “[b]oth the amount of the 
dealing and importance of the work allegedly infringed should 
be considered”.173 In applying this factor to the facts of CCH, the 
SCC noted that “[a]lthough the dealings might not be fair if a 
specific patron of the Great Library submitted numerous requests 
for multiple reported judicial decisions from the same reported 
series over a short period of time, there is no evidence that this has 
occurred.”174 In the absence of evidence, the SCC did not accept 
this finding (and as a result, concluded that this factor tended 
to fairness).
The Copyright Board, however, adopted a different approach in 
Alberta (Education). Although noting that “it seems that teachers 
generally limit themselves to reproducing relatively short excerpts 
from a work to complement the main textbook” (a result which 
should cause this factor to tend to fairness), the Copyright Board 
then stated that “[on] the other hand, in our view, it is more than 
likely that class sets will be subject to ‘numerous requests for…the 
same…series’, which would tend to make the amount of the dealing 
unfair on the whole.”175 It is unclear on what evidentiary basis (if 
any) the Copyright Board reached this conclusion.176 Reaching this 
GRAHAM REYNOLDS  |   29
conclusion in the absence of evidence would be inconsistent with the 
SCC’s decision in CCH, and with the purpose of the Copyright Act, 
as interpreted by the SCC. One way to ensure that copyright owners’ 
rights are not interpreted in an overbroad manner is to insist on 
evidence demonstrating the amount of the work that was used by the 
party relying on fair dealing, and, in the absence of such evidence, to 
decline to find that this factor tends to unfairness.
When analyzing the factor that addresses the effect of the dealing 
on the work, the Copyright Board also made assumptions, in the 
apparent absence of evidence, that led it to conclude that the dealing 
was unfair. As noted by the SCC in CCH, the effect of the dealing 
factor looks at whether the “reproduced work is likely to compete 
with the market of the original work”.177 If so, “this may suggest that 
the dealing is not fair”.178 Applying this factor to the facts of CCH, on 
the basis that “no evidence was tendered to show…that the publishers’ 
markets had been negatively affected by the Law Society’s custom 
photocopying service”,179 the SCC refused to find that “the market 
for the publishers’ works had decreased as a result of [the copies in 
question] having been made”.180 
The Copyright Board, however, in its decision in Alberta 
(Education), accepted the “uncontradicted evidence from textbook 
publishers…that textbook sales have shrunk by more than 30 per 
cent in 20 years”, noted that “[s]everal factors contributed to this 
decline, including the adoption of semester teaching, decrease in 
registrations, longer lifespan of textbooks, use of the Internet and 
other electronic tools, resource-based learning and use of class 
sets”,181 and, despite the fact that they were “not able to determine 
precisely to what extent each factor [described above] contributed 
to this decline”,182 concluded that “the impact of photocopies…is 
sufficiently important to compete with the original to an extent that 
makes the dealing unfair”.183 To paraphrase the SCC judgment in 
CCH, although “no evidence was tendered to show that the market 
for the publishers’ works had decreased as a result of these copies 
having been made”,184 the Copyright Board still “conclude[d] that 
photocopies made on a teacher’s initiative for his or her students have 
an unfair effect on the works in Access Copyright’s repertoire.”185 
Referring to the lack of evidence on this point as an “evidentiary 
30   |   THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY
vacuum”,186 Abella J criticized the Copyright Board’s conclusion that 
the photocopies had a sufficiently detrimental impact on the original 
to make this factor tend to unfairness, pointing out that “other than 
the bald fact of a decline in sales over 20 years, there is no evidence 
from Access Copyright demonstrating any link between photocopying 
short excerpts and the decline in textbook sales”.187 
In reaching its conclusion in the absence of such evidence, 
the Copyright Board adopted an approach to fair dealing that is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted 
by the SCC. This purpose requires a large and liberal interpretation 
to be given to users’ rights, and for courts and the Copyright Board 
to ensure that the rights of copyright owners are not overprotected. 
One way through which these outcomes can be achieved is to insist—
before concluding that the factor addressing the effect of the dealing 
on the work tends to unfairness—on evidence either linking the 
dealing with negative economic consequences for the work or works 
in question, or establishing that the dealing resulted in negative 
economic consequences.
In the above analysis, I have suggested that the approach to 
copyright adopted by the Copyright Board is inconsistent with the 
purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC. Although 
the Copyright Board framed its decision within the language of CCH 
(in which the SCC continued the process of articulating the modern 
understanding of the purpose of the Copyright Act as promoting an 
instrumental–public interest approach to copyright), its decision was 
shaped by its view that the outcome must “conform with” article 9(2) 
of the Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.188 
These two articles emphasize the ability of the copyright owner to 
control and to profit from the use of his or her works. While they 
contemplate (and accept) that there may be some limitations and 
exceptions to owners’ exclusive rights, these exceptions are limited. 
Such an approach, as described above, is inconsistent with the 
purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC, through 
which both copyright and user’s rights work in concert to advance 
the public interest by contributing to the development of a vibrant 
public domain, and in which users’ rights are given a large and liberal 
interpretation. Instead, the approach adopted by the Copyright Board 
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is more consistent with the author-centric approach to copyright, an 
approach that was explicitly rejected by the SCC in the pentalogy. 
Under this approach, exceptions and limitations to copyright 
infringement are narrowly interpreted in order to maximize the 
rewards given to (and protection offered to) authors and copyright 
owners. 
As a result of its adoption of an approach to fair dealing that is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by 
the SCC, the Copyright Board reached an outcome that fell outside of 
the range of possible, acceptable outcomes (as defined by the SCC). 
While some commentators question whether reviewing courts should 
have the final say on determining the range of possible, acceptable 
outcomes, such an approach, as outlined above, is consistent with SCC 
and appellate jurisprudence both in Dunsmuir and post-Dunsmuir. 
Thus, the conclusion reached by Abella J—that the Copyright Board’s 
decision is unreasonable—can be seen as defensible under the 
approach to the reasonableness analysis adopted in authorities such as 
Dunsmuir, CHRC, Celgene, HRM, and Toronto Police Services Board.189 
iii: significance of Alberta (Education) 
What, then, is the significance of Alberta (Education)? What does 
this decision portend for fair dealing, for the future of the Copyright 
Board, and for Canadian copyright law more generally? With respect 
to fair dealing, Alberta (Education) suggests that fair dealing is no 
longer merely “a matter of impression”.190 Rather, it is rooted in and 
shaped by the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the 
SCC—namely, to contribute to the development of a robust public 
domain. This purpose requires a broad interpretation to be given to 
fair dealing. 
One question that flows from this conclusion involves the nature 
of the fairness analysis. Rothstein J’s dissenting reasons in Alberta 
(Education) can be seen as being grounded in an assumption that 
“fairness” is a discretionary concept, one that is open-ended and 
capable of multiple interpretations. In Rothstein J’s view, the Copyright 
Board ought to be given wide latitude to apply the fairness factors 
to the facts of a specific dispute as it sees fit.191 Such an approach is 
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suggested in cases like Hubbard, cited with approval in CCH as well 
as other Canadian copyright decisions.192 If Rothstein J is correct, and 
if fairness is an open-ended, discretionary concept, then there would 
be little scope for appellate review when applying the reasonableness 
standard.
However, one conclusion that we can draw from Alberta 
(Education) is that fairness (and fair dealing more generally) is not as 
discretionary a concept as it appears to be (and as previous decisions, 
including CCH, have suggested it to be). From CCH, we know that 
the fair dealing categories are to be applied in a large and liberal 
manner.193 Abella J’s reasons in Alberta (Education), read alongside 
Bell, suggest that courts and the Copyright Board must also apply 
fairness in a large and liberal manner.
In Bell, Abella J affirmed the importance of fairness both to fair 
dealing and to the purpose of the Copyright Act. As stated by Abella 
J, the fairness analysis is the part of the fair dealing test in which the 
“analytical heavy-hitting is done in determining whether the dealing 
was fair.”194 It is the core of fair dealing. As such, it plays a particularly 
important role in “balanc[ing] between protection and access.”195 
Consequently, it must not be interpreted restrictively. Abella J’s 
reasons for judgment in Alberta (Education), in which she adopted a 
large and liberal approach to fairness, can thus be seen as the logical 
extension of—and an application of—her reasons in Bell.
The Copyright Board failed to apply a large and liberal approach 
when evaluating fairness. Instead, it adopted a narrow, restrictive 
interpretation of fairness (and fair dealing more generally). In so 
doing, the Copyright Board adopted an interpretation of fair dealing 
that was inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as 
interpreted by the SCC. This led it to arrive at an outcome that fell 
outside of the range of possible, acceptable outcomes.
If, following Bell and Alberta (Education), fairness is now 
considered to be rooted in and shaped by the purpose of the Copyright 
Act, as opposed to being an open-ended, discretionary concept, 
might the fairness analysis itself have to be modified to reflect this 
shift? Is the list of factors outlined in CCH still a “useful analytical 
framework to govern determinations of fairness”, as McLachlin CJ 
referred to it?196 Should this “structured approach” be reformed to 
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take into account the importance of fairness to fair dealing and to 
the purpose of the Copyright Act, as articulated by Abella J in Bell? If 
so, how might the fairness analysis be reformed? Should some factors 
dominate or have greater weight than others? Are some factors now 
irrelevant? Or, instead of modifying the “structured approach”, ought 
it be abandoned entirely in favour of a new approach to determining 
fairness (such as a proportionality analysis)? It remains to be seen 
how these questions, which are beyond the scope of this chapter to 
address, will play out in future jurisprudence.197
With respect to the future of the Copyright Board and its impact 
on copyright policy, Alberta (Education) is authority for the principle 
that reviewing courts can challenge decisions of the Copyright Board 
on the basis that the Copyright Board applied the Copyright Act in 
a manner that was inconsistent with the purpose of copyright, as 
interpreted by the SCC. Post-Alberta (Education), failure to apply the 
Copyright Act in a manner consistent with the purpose of copyright—
as interpreted by the SCC in cases such as Théberge, CCH, Bell, and 
Alberta (Education)—can lead to the Copyright Board’s decision 
being overturned by reviewing courts. 
This is not to say, however, that Abella J is dismissive of the ability 
of the Copyright Board to play a positive role in the development 
of Canadian copyright law. Based on her concurring reasons in 
Rogers, it appears that Abella J sees the Copyright Board as playing 
an important role in this process. Respectful of the Copyright Board’s 
expertise, Abella J would be prepared to defer to its judgments, even 
with respect to questions of law. 
Nevertheless, in Alberta (Education), Abella J emphasized that in 
interpreting and applying the Copyright Act, the Copyright Board must 
do so in a manner that is consistent with the purpose of the Copyright 
Act, as interpreted by the SCC. This approach—sitting uneasily with 
the idea of “deference as respect”198—is consistent with what Sheila 
Wildeman refers to as an “[attitude] of judicial supremacy” through 
which reviewing courts “[set] strict limits of legality within which 
administrative reasoning is closely hedged”.199
Seen through this lens, Abella J’s reasons in Alberta (Education) 
are consistent with her concurring reasons in Rogers. In Rogers, Abella 
J advocated for a deferential approach to be taken to decisions made 
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by the Copyright Board while maintaining, in Alberta (Education), 
that it is the role of the Court to set the limits of legality within which 
the Copyright Board may reason, and while setting those limits 
more narrowly than Rothstein J thinks is acceptable (based on his 
dissenting reasons in Alberta (Education)). 
The end result is that post-Alberta (Education), the Copyright 
Board is significantly constrained in its ability to shape Canadian 
copyright law. Abella J’s reasons for judgment in Alberta (Education) 
clarify that the Copyright Board does not have unlimited discretion 
under fairness (and fair dealing more broadly) to implement policy 
goals or promote values that are inconsistent with the purpose of the 
Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC.
It can be argued that Canadian copyright law and policy may 
suffer as a result of this outcome. If the Copyright Board does have 
“specialized expertise”, and if it does “[play] an important role in 
achieving the proper balance between [owners and users]”,200 then 
it could perhaps have offered interpretations of the purpose of the 
Copyright Act different from those set out by the SCC, contributing 
to the “wider constitutional project…of public justification…
shared among the legislative, judicial, and executive/administrative 
branches.”201 Wildeman refers to this “model of constitutional 
ordering” as “‘constitutional pluralism’, wherein all three branches of 
government participate in working out the significance of the legal 
norms governing the exercise of state power”.202 The ability of the 
Copyright Board to contribute to this project, in the context of the 
Copyright Act, is limited by Alberta (Education). 
Alberta (Education), however, will not necessarily lead to the 
marginalization of the Copyright Board, an institution described 
by Canadian academics as playing “a crucial but underappreciated 
role in shaping Canadian copyright policy”203 and a “pivotal role in 
balancing the seesaw of interests in Canada’s copyright playground”.204 
Instead, Alberta (Education) can serve as the starting point for a new 
era in the history of the Copyright Board and in the development of 
Canadian copyright policy. If the Copyright Board responds to the 
SCC’s decision in Alberta (Education) by wholeheartedly embracing 
the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC, it can 
become what Abella J envisions based on her judgments in Rogers 
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and Alberta (Education)—a body that truly plays an important role 
in contributing to Canadian copyright policy by advancing the public 
interest in matters of copyright: that fairly rewards copyright owners; 
increases and facilitates access to works; and ultimately contributes to 
the development of a vibrant public domain. If the Copyright Board 
does not seize this opportunity, however, and continues to apply an 
approach to copyright that is inconsistent with the purpose of the 
Copyright Act as interpreted by the SCC, then Abella J’s reasons for 
judgment in Alberta (Education) provide reviewing courts with the 
framework through which they can—defensibly and in a manner 
consistent with prior jurisprudence—overturn the decisions of the 
Copyright Board on the basis that they are unreasonable. 
The story of the pentalogy with respect to judicial review of 
Copyright Board decisions is thus not a story about inconsistency 
and the inadvertent application of an incorrect standard of review. 
It is instead a story about the continuing evolution of the SCC’s 
interpretation of the purpose of the Copyright Act—from rewarding 
and protecting authors and copyright owners, to contributing to the 
development of a robust public domain—a process that originated in 
Théberge, was advanced in CCH, and was articulated most recently in 
the pentalogy; of the fairness analysis and its shift from a discretionary, 
open-ended concept to one that is rooted in and shaped by the 
purpose of the Copyright Act; and of the tension between the SCC 
and the Copyright Board with respect to the proper interpretation of 
the purpose of the Copyright Act. 
It is a story that points to two possible futures: one of continued 
tension between the SCC and the Copyright Board, and one in 
which both institutions work together toward a common purpose. 
Ultimately, it is up to the Copyright Board to write the epilogue to 
the story of the Canadian copyright pentalogy; to determine—based 
on whether it chooses to interpret the Copyright Act in a manner 
consistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by 
the SCC—the future it wishes for itself.205
©
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